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ARTICLES
WHO’S AFRAID OF UNENUMERATED RIGHTS?
*

Randy E. Barnett

As most scholars today would acknowledge, there are not one but
two distinct unenumerated rights provisions mentioned in the text of
the Constitution: the Ninth Amendment’s injunction that “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
1
to deny or disparage others retained by the people,” and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment’s command that, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
2
States . . . .” For nearly twenty years now, I have been defending the
proposition that the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment lim3
its federal power. Meanwhile Michael Kent Curtis almost singlehandedly reversed the conventional wisdom about the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which now, most admit,
protects unenumerated rights (along with rights from the Bill of
4
Rights) from interference by the states.
In this essay, I will not examine the evidence of original meaning
that supports this reading of these two clauses. Instead, I propose to
take up the next most challenging topics, once one concedes this
original meaning: Why have these two clauses been ignored by courts
for most of their lengthy histories, and how can they be put into effect in a practical fashion? Answering the first of these question is essential to answering the second. In my view, there is not just one but
several reasons why two expressed provisions have been redacted

*

Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law Center. This
paper was prepared for the University of Pennsylvanian Journal of Constitutional Law Symposium
on “The Future of Unenumerated Rights,” University of Pennsylvania Law School, February 10,
2006.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
2
Id. amend. XIV.
3
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming Nov. 2006) (explaining the author’s view of the Ninth Amendment); Randy E.
Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing for the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment).
4
See generally MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
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from our written Constitution. To restore these portions of the Constitution requires that we identify the reasons why they were lost.
I. EARLY RESERVATIONS ABOUT UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
While some may think that the Ninth Amendment was lost from
the very beginning, others know better. In the first Congress, Representative James Madison invoked the Ninth Amendment in his famous speech opposing the constitutionality of the Bank of the United
States. There he affirmed: “The latitude of interpretation required by
the bill is condemned by the rule furnished by the Constitution it5
self.” As one authority for this “rule” of interpretation, Madison
cited the Ninth Amendment:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves, at
least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now
contended for. . . . He read several of the articles proposed, remarking
particularly on the 11th [the Ninth Amendment] and 12th [the Tenth
Amendment], the former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation; the
latter, as excluding every source or power not within the Constitution it6
self.

Some ten years later, Virginia jurist and scholar St. George Tucker,
offered a similar federal power-constraining construction of the
Ninth Amendment:
All the powers of the federal government being either expressly
enumerated, or necessary and proper to the execution of some enumerated power; and it being one of the rules of construction which sound
reason has adopted; that, as exception strengthens the force of a law in
cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it, in cases not enumerated;
it follows, as a regular consequence, that every power which concerns the right
of the citizen, must be construed strictly, where it may operate to infringe
or impair his liberty; and liberally, and for his benefit, where it may operate to his security and happiness, the avowed object of the constitu7
tion . . . .

This passage concerning the individual rights of citizens is immediately followed by and distinguished from Tucker’s assertion of states
rights:
[A]nd, in like manner, every power which has been carved out of the states,
who, at the time of entering into the confederacy, were in full possession
of all the rights of sovereignty, is in like manner to be construed strictly,
5

2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (1791) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1951 (The Eleventh and Twelfth proposed amendments that Madison referenced
were eventually adopted as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments) (emphasis added).
7
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. at 307–08 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) (emphasis added).
6
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wherever a different construction might derogate from the rights and powers, which by the latter of these articles; are expressly acknowledged to be re8
served to them respectively.

This distinction between the individual and personal nature of the
rights retained by the people, and the rights of states is also made explicit in another passage from Tucker: “As federal it is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of a state may
9
be drawn in question . . . .” This sentence includes a footnote citing
the Tenth (Twelfth) Amendment. The passage then continues:
[A]s a social compact it ought likewise to receive the same strict construction, wherever the right of personal liberty, of personal security, or of private
property may become the subject of dispute; because every person whose
liberty or property was thereby rendered subject to the new government,
was antecedently a member of a civil society to whose regulations he had
submitted himself, and under whose authority and protection he still re10
mains, in all cases not expressly submitted to the new government.

This passage is followed by a footnote reference to the Ninth (Eleventh) and Tenth (Twelfth) Amendments.
Despite this original public meaning of the Ninth Amendment,
courts have been reluctant to explicitly protect unenumerated rights.
In Calder v. Bull, decided between Madison and Tucker’s invocation
of the Ninth Amendment, we see Justice Chase famously affirming
the potential unconstitutionality of laws that violate unenumerated
rights. His argument is worth reproducing at length:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without control; although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State. The people
of the United States erected their Constitutions, or forms of government,
to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons and property from violence.
The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature
and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature,
and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental
principle flows from the very nature of our free Republican governments,
that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor
to refrain from acts which the laws permit. There are acts which the Federal, or
State, Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are
certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power;
as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security
for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established. An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a
8
9
10

Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
Id. at 151 (internal citation omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).

4ARTICLES_REVISED.DOC

4

11/15/2006 5:40:08 PM

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:1

law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
11
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.

Chase’s view of unenumerated rights fits completely with that of
Madison and Tucker, though this being an exercise of state power,
the Ninth Amendment’s affirmation of limited federal power was not
pertinent to the question before the Court.
In contrast with Chase, we have Justice Iredell’s almost-equallyfamous concurring opinion denying the legal force of unenumerated
limits on legislative power:
If, then, a government, composed of Legislative, Executive and Judicial
departments, were established, by a Constitution, which imposed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence would inevitably be, that
whatever the legislative power chose to enact, would be lawfully enacted,
and the judicial power could never interpose to pronounce it void. It is
true, that some speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against
natural justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such
a government, any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare it so.
. . . If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general
scope of their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be
void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of
natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed
standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject;
and all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that
the Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an
act which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract
12
principles of natural justice.

One reason why I find Justice Iredell’s denial in Calder both interesting and disturbing is how it contrasts with his colorful affirmation
of unenumerated rights before the North Carolina ratification convention ten years earlier. To those who urged the Constitution be rejected because it lacked a bill of rights, he replied:
[I]t would not only be useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of
rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by the government without usurpation; and it
would be impossible to enumerate every one. Let any one make what
collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately men13
tion twenty or thirty more rights not contained in it.

By opposing the enactment of a bill of rights on this ground, Iredell
is here contending that all rights should remain unenumerated. He

11

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–88 (1798).
Id. at 398–99 (Iredell, J., concurring).
13
4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 167 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1861) [hereinafter DEBATES].
12
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further contends that impairing such unenumerated rights would be
a usurpation Nowhere in this speech does he suggest that only enumerated limitations on legislative power would be enforceable, as he
14
(Imagine the effect of his argument on the
later did in Calder.
North Carolina debate if he had!)
One or the other of these claims by Iredell cast him in a poor
light. At the North Carolina convention, he could have been concealing his skepticism about the effectiveness of unenumerated rights
in service of his opposition to a bill of rights that would expressly
limit federal power. Or in Calder, he could have been concealing his
belief that violations of unenumerated rights are usurpations in favor
of assertions of state and federal legislative power. Of course, he
could also have simply changed his mind.
It will not do to reconcile Iredell’s apparent inconsistency by
claiming he was speaking in Calder only of the propriety of judicial review, and that he could well have believed that legislative violations of
unenumerated rights were usurpations, while maintaining it was not a
matter for courts to resolve. While it is likely he did believe this, it
would still not justify his earlier opposition to the very sorts of express
restrictions on federal power that were being urged by AntiFederalists. The most charitable account of Iredell’s opposition is
that the Anti-Federalists themselves were more interested in defeating
the Constitution than gaining a bill of rights, and Federalists like Iredell were more interested in securing ratification against AntiFederalist objections. Neither side cared much about a bill of rights.
Be this is as it may, it was Justice Iredell’s stance on unenumerated
limits on legislative power expressed in Calder, not Justice Chase’s,
that came to be the dominant treatment of unenumerated rights:
that they were not a matter for judicial protection. I now turn to the
issue of why.
II. THE POSITIVIST TURN
As reflected in Iredell’s concurrence, early in our legal history
judges made a decided turn away from natural rights as a basis of limiting legislative power and towards a positivist approach that enforced
whatever laws did not violated express prohibitions. By “positivism,” I
14

Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring) (“In order, therefore, to guard
against so great an evil, it has been the policy of all the American states, which have, individually,
framed their state constitutions since the revolution, and of the people of the United States,
when they framed the Federal Constitution, to define with precision the objects of the legislative power, and to restrain its exercise within marked and settled boundaries. If any act of Congress, or of the Legislature of a state, violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though, I admit, that as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful
nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear and urgent case.”)
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simply mean that statutes enacted by popularly-elected legislatures
are laws binding on judges, unless they violate an express prohibition
in a popularly-enacted constitution. Persons holding such a view
could well acknowledge the existence of natural rights by which the
prudence or morality of laws could be assessed, while denying, as Iredell did, the pertinence of this inquiry to constitutional adjudication.
I do not intend to make a strong historical claim about how and
why this shift took place. Such an inquiry would necessitate a far
more extensive treatment of historical context than the evidence of
linguistic usage that is required by original meaning originalism.
That some such shift took place, however, is widely acknowledged.
The positivist turn was manifested in at least two contexts.
The first was the embrace of Blackstone by American lawyers.
This is evidenced by Iredell’s concurrence itself, in which he cites
Blackstone:
Sir William Blackstone, having put the strong case of an act of Parliament,
which should authorise a man to try his own cause, explicitly adds, that
even in that case, “there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of
the Legislature, when couched in such evident and express words, as
15
leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the Legislature, or no.”

It is precisely because Iredell apparently accepts this background
principle of legislative supremacy that he asserts the need for express
prohibitions on legislative power “to guard against so great an evil” as
16
complete legislative authority of the sort possessed by Parliament.
While some point to Blackstone’s early popularity among American lawyers to show that natural rights were never considered justiciable, the evidence—including Chase’s opinion in Calder—suggests
otherwise. So too does founder and Justice James Wilson’s condemnation in Chisholm v. Georgia of the unhealthy influence of Blackstone’s view of sovereignty:
This last position is only a branch of a much more extensive principle, on
which a plan of systematic despotism has been lately formed in England,
and prosecuted with unwearied assiduity and care. Of this plan the author of the Commentaries was, if not the introducer, at least the great
supporter. He has been followed in it by writers later and less known;
and his doctrines have, both on the other and this side of the Atlantic,
been implicitly and generally received by those, who neither examined
their principles nor their consequences. The principle is, that all human law
must be prescribed by a superior. This principle I mean not now to examine. Suffice it, at present to say, that another principle, very different in
its nature and operations, forms, in my judgment, the basis of sound and
genuine jurisprudence; laws derived from the pure source of equality and
justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedience
15
16

Id. at 398–99 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *91).
Id. at 399.
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they require. The sovereign, when traced to his source, must be found in
17
the man.

Like the other founders, Wilson denied that “sovereignty” resides in
the government as opposed to the people:
To the Constitution of the United States, the term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used
with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and established that Constitution. They might have announced themselves “SOVEREIGN” people of
the United States: But serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the os18
tentatious declaration.

Wilson then adds, “As the State has claimed precedence of the people;
so, in the same inverted course of things, the Government has often
claimed precedence of the State; and to this perversion in the second
degree, many of the volumes of confusion concerning sovereignty
19
owe their existence.”
By contrast, it is revealing that we find Iredell once again on the
other side of this debate. In his opinion in Chisholm, he strongly asserts the concept of state sovereignty:
Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not
been delegated to the United States, I consider to be as completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered. The
United States are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually
surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers re20
served.

Iredell questions the extent of federal judges’ authority to enforce
the Constitution without an authorization by Congress:
My conception of the Constitution is entirely different. I conceive, that
all the courts of the United States must receive, not merely their organization as to the number of Judges of which they are to consist; but all their
authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the Legislature
only. This appears to me to be one of those cases, with many others, in
which an article of the Constitution cannot be effectuated without the in21
tervention of the Legislative authority.

To this proposition he admits of only one exception that presages his
stance in Calder: if Congress exceeds its express authority under the
Constitution, its law is null and void.
If they do, I have no hesitation to say, that any act to that effect would be
utterly void, because it would be inconsistent with the Constitution,
which is a fundamental law paramount to all others, which we are not

17
18
19
20
21

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 458 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 435 (majority opinion).
Id. at 432.
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only bound to consult, but sworn to observe; and, therefore, where there
is an interference, being superior in obligation to the other, we must un22
questionably obey that in preference.

So here, as in Calder, according to Iredell, the only restrictions on the
powers of Congress that are to be enforced by the courts are those
expressed in the Constitution.
The decided shift to Blackstonian theory in America was noted by
Thomas Jefferson who commented in 1814:
I join in your reprobation of our merchants, priests, and lawyers, for their
adherence to England and monarchy, in preference to their own country
and its Constitution. . . . With the lawyers it is a new thing. They have, in
the Mother country, been generally the firmest supporters of the free
principles of their constitution. But there too they have changed. I ascribe much of this to the substitution of Blackstone for my Lord Coke, as
an elementary work. In truth, Blackstone and Hume have made tories of
all England, and are making tories of those young Americans whose native feelings of independence do not place them above the wily sophistries of a Hume or a Blackstone. These two books, but especially the former, have done more towards the suppression of the liberties of man,
than all the million of men in arms of Bonaparte and the millions of human lives with the sacrifice of which he will stand loaded before the
judgment seat of his Maker. I fear nothing for our liberty from the assaults of force; but I have seen and felt much, and fear more from English books, English prejudices, English manners, and the apes, the dupes,
23
and designs among our professional crafts.

In his 1820 book condemning the reasoning of McCulloch v. Maryland, fellow Virginian John Taylor began by lambasting the growing
use of the concept of “sovereignty” underlying Blackstonian positivism.
I do not know how it has happened, that this word has crept into our
political dialect, unless it be that mankind prefer mystery to knowledge;
and that governments love obscurity better than specification. . . .
Neither the declaration of independence, nor the federal constitution, nor the constitution of any single state, uses this equivocal and illim24
itable word.

Taylor explains why, in a system such as that of the United States, the
concept of sovereignty is deeply confused:
The idea of investing servants with sovereignty, and that of investing ourselves with a sovereignty over other nations, were equally preposterous.
Sovereignty implies superiority and subordination. It was therefore inapplicable to a case of equality, and more so to the subordinate power in

22

Id. at 433.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Horatio Gates Spafford (Mar. 17, 1814), in 14 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 118, 119–20 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., Mem’l ed. 1904).
24
JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED, AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 25 (1820).
23
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reference to its creator. The word being rejected by our constitutions,
cannot be correctly adopted for their construction; because, if this
unanimous rejection arose from its unfitness for their design of defining
and limiting powers, its interpolation by construction for the purpose of
extending these same powers, would be an evident inconsistency. It
would produce several very obvious contradictions in our political principles. It would transfer sovereignty from the people, (confining it to
mean the right of self-government only,) to their own servants. It would
invest governments and departments, invested with limited powers only,
with unspecified powers. It would create many sovereignties, each having
a right to determine the extent of its sovereignty by its own will. And if
two sovereignties over the same subjects could never agree, it would propose for our consideration what was to be expected from an army of sovereignties. Our constitutions, therefore, wisely rejected this indefinite
word as a traitor of civil rights, and endeavored to kill it dead by specifications and restrictions of power, that it might never again be used in po25
litical disquisitions.

Nevertheless, the notion that sovereignty resided in the state and
federal legislatures took hold, as did the notion expressed by Iredell
that the only restrictions on that power of which courts may take notice are those expressly stipulated in the Constitution. With this as a
conceptual foundation, there is little or no room for unenumerated
rights restricting the powers of the legislature.
The second manifestation of the positivist turn among the judiciary concerned the legality of slavery. As was poignantly described by
26
Robert Cover in Justice Accused, even abolition-inclined judges asserted the proposition that the positive law of Congress trumped any
considerations of natural justice, as did the positive law of the Constitution itself. The divide between natural rights constraints on legislative power and a positivistic respect for legislative supremacy is wellillustrated by the lengthy and impassioned debate in the 1840s between radical abolitionists Lysander Spooner and Wendell Phillips.
While Spooner conceded that the positive law violating natural
rights could be enforceable, he contended that constitutional meaning should not be construed as violating natural rights unless expressed with unmistakable clearness. Spooner based his approach to
constitutional construction on John Marshall’s maxim of statutory
construction: “Where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of the laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect

25

Id. at 26.
See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 60
(1975) (noting how judges were unwilling to engage in an open-ended exploration of the natural rights of slaves unless explicitly authorized by positive law).
26
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27

such objects.” Spooner applied Marshall’s version of a “clear statement rule” to the Constitution itself:
1st, that no intention, in violation of natural justice and natural
right . . . can be ascribed to the constitution, unless that intention be expressed in terms that are legally competent to express such an intention;
and 2d, that no terms, except those that are plenary, express, explicit,
distinct, unequivocal, and to which no other meaning can be given, are legally
28
competent to authorize or sanction anything contrary to natural right.

As did St. George Tucker, Spooner contended that “all language
29
must be construed ‘strictly’ in favor of natural right.” In essence, like
Tucker, Spooner adopted what I have called, a “presumption of liberty.”
In contrast, fellow abolitionist Wendell Phillips, a close ally of William Lloyd Garrison, hotly rejected Spooner’s natural law approach
in favor of a strongly majoritarian version of Austinian positivism:
There can be no more self-evident proposition, than that, in every Government, the majority must rule, and their will be uniformly obeyed. Now,
if the majority enact a wicked law, and the Judge refuses to enforce it,
which is to yield, the Judge, or the majority? Of course, the first. On any
30
other supposition, Government is impossible.

In contrast to the self-educated Spooner, who hailed from rural
Athol, Massachusetts, and read for the bar in Worcester (albeit with
two distinguished Massachusetts lawyers and statesman: John Davis
and Charles Allen), the Harvard-educated Phillips was a student of
Joseph Story. Phillips’ positivism fit squarely with Story’s willingness
31
in Prigg v. Pennsylvania to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act well beyond
that which was required by the text of the Fugitive Slave Clause in Ar32
ticle IV. Story’s stance was simply the obverse of Phillips. Whereas
Philips and Garrison concluded that because the Constitution sanctioned slavery, it was a “covenant with death and an agreement with
33
hell”, Story considered himself bound by the positive law, apparently
27

United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805).
LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 58–59 (rev. ed. 1860), reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER: ANTI-SLAVERY WRITINGS (Charles
Shively ed., photo. reprint 1971).
29
Id. at 17–18.
30
WENDELL PHILLIPS, REVIEW OF LYSANDER SPOONER’S ESSAY ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
OF SLAVERY 10 (Boston, Andrews & Prentis 1847) (Arno Press, photo. reprint 1969); see also id.
at 8 n.* (citing 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE
LAW (Robert Campbell ed., London, John Murray 3d ed. 1869)).
31
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
32
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to
whom Service or Labour may be due.”).
33
WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ANTISLAVERY SOCIETY (Jan. 27,
1843), reprinted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 663 (10th ed. 1919).
28
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even where the Fugitive Slave Act went beyond the injunction of Article IV. Likewise, Phillips’ vociferous argument that the Constitution
34
was a “pro-slavery document” —in the publication that initially provoked Spooner to write his book—was adopted in its entirety by Chief
Justice Taney in Dred Scott.
Whether the felt need to uphold slavery to preserve the Union
motivated the positivist turn in the judiciary, or whether that turn had
previously been implanted by Blackstonian views of sovereignty accepted by Federalists in pursuit of broad national power, I do not
know. According to Cover, the tragedy of all this was that opinions
about the proper role of judges were still fluid enough going into the
35
1940s that a natural rights approach was still possible. But judges
instead took to positivism as their response to attacks on the injustice
of slavery, and this view of the role of judges remains with us to this
day, causing many to be hostile to the judicial protection of unenumerated rights.
III. THE UNCERTAINTY OF IDENTIFYING UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
In addition to the view of judging that stems from Blackstonian
views of sovereignty and Austinian views of positivism, there is another reason why some are afraid of the judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights: they fear that the content of unenumerated
rights is too uncertain and contestable to be enforced by courts. This
concern too was expressed in Iredell’s concurrence in Calder:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest
and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the
Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the Legislature
(possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the
opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of
36
natural justice.

I suspect that this, even more than concerns with sovereignty and a
positivist conception of law, largely explains why the protection of
unenumerated rights remains so controversial.
According to this concern, judges should do only what they are
qualified to do and that is to enforce “the rule laid down.” They have
no particular expertise to identify fundamental rights, the content of
which is not provided to them by an authoritative source. As Robert
Bork put the matter: “[L]egal reasoning must begin with a body of
34

See WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION: A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT: SELECTIONS FROM
MADISON PAPERS, ETC. 3–7 (photo. reprint 1969) (N.Y. City, Am. Anti-Slavery Soc’y 1844)
(summarizing the pro-slavery characteristics of the Constitution).
35
See generally COVER, supra note 26, at 8–30 (describing how the tradition of positivism created the foundation for the notion that judges should be will-less).
36
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring).
THE
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rules or principles or major premises that are independent of the
37
judge’s preferences.” The process of identifying the content of unenumerated rights appears to be indistinguishable as a practical matter from adopting a judge’s personal preferences. As Justice Scalia
wrote: “when one does not have a solid textual anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the general rule, its pro38
nouncement appears uncomfortably like legislation.”
It is a bit difficult to separate completely the uncertainty of unenumerated rights from the concepts of positivism or sovereignty. If
the identification of unenumerated rights involves a choice unguided
by the text of the Constitution, then why does this choice properly reside in the judiciary as opposed to the legislature? In other words,
what gives courts the authority to enforce rights not specified in the
text of the Constitution? As Robert Bork argued, if courts can simply
reach the right results unconstrained or unguided by pre-existing law,
then:
What can he say of a Court that does not share his politics or his morality? What can an admirer of the Warren Court say if the Supreme Court
should become dominated by conservative activists? What can he say of
the Taney Court’s Dred Scott decision? He cannot say that the decision
was the exercise of an illegitimate power because he has already conceded that power. There seems nothing he can say except that the Court
is politically wrong and that he is morally justified in evading its rulings
whenever he can and overthrowing it if possible in order to replace it
with a body that will produce results he likes. In his view, the Court has
39
no legitimacy as a legal institution.

He then offers this colorful challenge:
Why should the Court, a committee of nine lawyers, be the sole agent for
overriding democratic outcomes? The man who prefers results to processes has no reason to say that the Court is more legitimate than any
other institution capable of wielding power. If the Court will not agree
with him, why not argue his case to some other group, say the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, a body with a rather better means for enforcing its deci40
sions? No answer exists.

But there is an answer, and it lies in what it is that makes a constitution legitimate, as well as in the original meaning of the text of the
U.S. Constitution.

37

ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
264–65 (1990).
38
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1185 (1989).
39
BORK, supra note 37, at 265.
40
Id.
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IV. THE IMPERATIVE OF UNENUMERATED RIGHTS
I hope I have made plausible the claim that, while some persons—
perhaps even most—may be afraid of unenumerated rights for practical reasons, others are afraid for reasons pertaining to political sovereignty or the proper role of the judiciary. Even the practical objections, however, are not unrelated to matters of political authority and
the legitimacy of judicial review. So, before addressing the practical
concerns directly it is necessary first to consider why, to be legitimate,
a legal system needs somehow to protect unenumerated rights. For
only if one accepts the imperative of protecting unenumerated rights
does one have a compelling motivation to confront and overcome
the practical difficulties of identifying and enforcing unenumerated
rights.
The root of the problem is democratic rule itself. As political philosopher Jeffrey Reiman has observed:
[T]here is nothing inherently legitimating about the electoral process. If
anything, the electoral process is the problem, not the solution. . . .
[T]he policies that emerge from the electoral process will be imposed on
the dissenting minority against its wishes. And then, rather than answering the question of legitimacy, this will raise the question with respect to
those dissenters. Why are the exercises of power approved by the majority against the wishes of (and potentially prohibiting the desired actions
of) the minority obligatory with respect to the minority? Why are such
exercises of power not simply a matter of the majority tyrannizing the
41
minority?

Reiman then points in the direction of an answer to these questions:
These questions not only point up the error of taking electoral accountability as an independent source of legitimacy, they also suggest
that it is mistaken to think of electoral accountability and constitutional
provisions as alternative sources of legitimacy. Rather, the Constitution
with its provision limiting the majority’s ability to exercise power is the answer to
the question of why decisions voted by a majority are binding on the mi42
nority who disagree.

I would recast Reiman’s point in terms of the rights retained by
the people. A legal regime could be legitimate, and its commands
binding, if those who are bound actually consented to its jurisdiction.
Such is the case, I suggest, for all of us having consented to the rules
of this conference, or of the University of Pennsylvania, so long as we
remain here. But whatever you may think about the existence and
import of such consent to governance, the U.S. Constitution—or any
constitution for that matter—cannot claim the unanimous consent of
41

Jeffrey Reiman, The Constitution, Rights, and the Conditions of Legitimacy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION 127, 134 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988).
42
Id.
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the governed. Its legitimacy, if legitimate it be, must derive from
some other quality.
Elsewhere, I have offered a possible alternative source of legiti43
macy. If laws imposed on non-consenting persons are proper insofar
as they do not violate their rights, then the affected persons cannot
complain. And if these proper laws are also necessary to protect the
rights of others, then the persons on whom they are imposed are
duty-bound to obey these laws for the very same reason that they are
bound to respect the rights of others. Rights, after all, entail correlative duties in others. Laws that are the means of protecting the rights
of others may partake in these same duties. Or so it seems reasonable
to contend.
In short, laws that respect the rights of those upon whom they are
imposed and that are needed to protect the rights of others are binding regardless of whether they were consented to. On this account, a
legal system is legitimate if it contains procedures that assure us that
the laws enacted and enforced are of this rights-respecting and rightsprotecting nature. A constitution that lacks the unanimous consent
of the people it governs could still be legitimate, therefore, if it includes procedures that respect and protect the rights retained by the
people.
This is not to say that judicial review of legislation to see if it violates these rights is warranted a priori. Any set of procedures that
provides this assurance would be enough (although the more reliably
rights are respected and protected, the more legitimate is a nonconsensual legal regime). For example, if one concludes that the bare
fact that laws are enacted by popularly-elected representatives of
those who are allowed to vote is enough to assure that these laws are
rights-respecting and rights-protecting, there would be no need for
judicial review to ensure a respect for either enumerated or unenumerated rights. But Reiman reminds us of what the founding generation learned to their dismay: there is no assurance that a majority
will not violate the rights of the minority. For that matter, there is no
assurance that elected representatives will not violate the rights of the
majority. Indeed, there is also no assurance that majorities might not
be stampeded into endorsing policies that violate their own rights, as
they later come to regret.
So the founders decided to protect the rights retained by the
people by adopting a number of formal constraints. They created a
system that included, inter alia, a divided legislature, a presidential
veto of legislation subject to override by a supermajority of both legis43

See generally Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (2003) (arguing that a constitution is legitimate to the extent it establishes lawmaking procedures that
adequately ensure the justice of its enacted laws).
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lative chambers, and a federal government of limited and enumerated powers. They then put this whole complex system in writing and
established an independent judiciary with lifetime tenure and the
power to interpret and enforce its terms.
To all of these structural features, they later added an express bill
of rights either as “actual limitations” on the written delegated powers
44
of Congress or “for greater caution.” To protect against any inference, that “by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of
power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration, and it might follow, by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the
45
hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure,”
the Ninth Amendment was added to the list of enumerated rights.
Much later in our history, this structural arrangement was fundamentally altered by an additional written protection of the unenumerated
rights retained by the people from infringement by their state governments in the form of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
46
Fourteenth Amendment.
Once again, it does not automatically follow that judicial review to
ensure that legislation does not infringe upon the rights retained by
the people is absolutely necessary to protect the unenumerated
rights, privileges, or immunities to which the Constitution expressly
refers. Perhaps, even in the absence of judicial review, all these rights
are sufficiently well protected by the political process to provide the
assurance that nonconsensual legal regimes require to be legitimate.
Or perhaps judicial review would cause more harm than good given
the uncertainty surrounding the content of unenumerated rights.
But if, as an empirical matter, one lacks faith in the reliability of the
legislative process in protecting the rights of minorities, majorities, or
mere individuals, and if one concludes that judicial protection of unenumerated rights can make things better rather than worse, then
one would have the requisite will to enforce unenumerated rights,
provided one had a practical way to do so.
In considering the practical difficulties with protecting unenumerated rights, one must also consider the serious practical difficulty
of our current system of protecting only some, but not all unenumerated rights. Current Due Process Clause doctrine protects only those
unenumerated rights that are deemed by the courts to be “funda-

44

James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments (June 8,
1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 196, 202 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland
eds., 1979).
45
Id. at 206.
46
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
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mental” and leaves unprotected those rights that are deemed by the
courts to be mere “liberty interests.” This doctrine, then, requires an
extra analytic step by courts. Not only must they identify what are the
rights retained by the people, they must also make the additional
contestable distinction between those rights that are fundamental
and those that are not. If courts are incompetent to identify the
background rights retained by the people, they surely seem incompetent squared in trying to distinguish which of these allegedly indefinite rights are more important than others. And what gives them the
authority to make this sort of judgment?
Moreover, courts now purport to make this distinction between
fundamental rights and mere liberty interests by assessing whether a
particular claim of right is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”
47
or “deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition and history.” I say “purport to do so” because the results of any such analysis depend entirely
on how a court chooses to define the rights at issue. If you ask
whether the rights to preserve one’s life or to avoid needless pain and
suffering are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply
rooted in the nation’s tradition and history you get one result. If you
ask whether the same can be said about the right to smoke cannabis
for medical purposes you get the opposite result.
Yet both formulations accurately describe the conduct at issue.
They merely describe the conduct at two different levels of generality.
Since both characterizations are descriptively accurate, but each leads
to an opposite outcome, a court may usually reach any result it wishes
merely by choosing one of these two accurate descriptions of the
right being claimed. To a large extent, therefore, present doctrine
leaves the matter of protecting “fundamental” rights entirely to the
fiat of judges.
There are two obvious ways to avoid this serious practical problem:
one can deny protection to all unenumerated rights, a stance that has
never been accepted in our constitutional history, or one can protect
all the rights retained by the people equally. While the latter alternative would necessitate the identification of these unenumerated
rights, it would avoid the additional and highly contestable step of
discriminating among these rights. Plus, as we shall see in the next
section, once one realizes what judicial protection of rights really entails, the pressure to identify them with great specificity is greatly reduced.

47

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1996) (“[T]he Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”) (citations omitted).
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V. ENFORCING UNENUMERATED RIGHTS WITHOUT FEAR (OR FAVOR)
Once one accepts the imperative of protecting unenumerated
rights to the legitimacy of a constitution, the only remaining obstacle
is the practical one of how to do so given their contestable content.
The key to overcoming this alleged difficulty is to realize the following: The underlying source of this fear has less to do with the impracticality of identifying unenumerated rights than it does the perceived consequences of doing so.
For example, if a right protected by the Constitution is “absolute”—that is, not subject to regulation of any kind—then the practical implications of protecting all but a handful of fundamental rights
would be enormous. If all liberty was protected equally, regulation
would cease and, with it, most government functions—even government functions clearly authorized by the U.S. Constitution. With this
“absolute” notion of constitutional rights in mind, it is easy to see how
some would fear enforcing any but a small handful of rights, whether
enumerated or not. Those holding this conception of constitutional
rights would want either to limit sharply the rights protected by the
courts to those that are really “fundamental” or eliminate judicial
rights protection altogether, trusting instead to the judgment of majoritarian decision making.
In other words, the stakes involved in determining the exact content of unenumerated rights is raised enormously if one believes that
the consequences of judicially protecting such a right is so momentous. If, on the other hand, the “cost” of judicially protecting constitutional rights was much lower, then we could tolerate considerably
more uncertainty in identifying unenumerated ones. Given this insight, it is worth noting that, for better or worse, we do not now protect even enumerated fundamental rights absolutely.
Take the rights of freedom of speech and assembly. Under current law, wrongful exercises of speech in the form of fraud and defa48
mation are completely unprotected.
The “right” of freedom of
speech does not even apply to these forms of verbal communication
that we otherwise would call “speech.” Prohibiting altogether this
type of speech is considered completely unproblematic. Also under
current First Amendment doctrine, the right of peaceable assembly
can constitutionally be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
49
regulations of its exercise. In order to protest legally in the streets,

48

See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 861 (2d ed.
1988) (“[L]ibelous speech was long regarded as a form of personal assault, and it was accordingly assumed that government could vindicate the individual’s right to enjoyment of his good
name, no less than his bodily integrity, without running afoul of the Constitution.”).
49
See id. at 794 (discussing time, place, or manner regulation).
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for example, you can be required to obtain a parade permit. Provided the scheme of regulation is not designed to unduly burden the
exercise of this right, or especially burden some viewpoints or benefit
others, it is entirely constitutional.
So what does it actually mean in practice to protect a right as
“fundamental” and subject legislation affecting such a right to “strict
scrutiny”? In the main, it means ensuring: (1) that only wrongful
speech that violates the equal rights of others is prohibited; and (2)
that the exercise of rightful speech is not unduly burdened. A legal
restriction is an undue burden when it is either not needed to protect
the liberties of others, such as the liberty to use the streets and parks
unimpeded by protesters, or when it is used against the rights of
51
some because of their views.
I realize that this summary greatly oversimplifies the complexity of
laws regulating and banning speech and assembly, but does it not
capture the heart of what our current approach is attempting to accomplish? Allow the “legitimate” exercise of these rights, and therefore exclude such wrongful acts as fraud and defamation, while mitigating the affect of these rights on the liberties of others by
regulating the time, place and manner of their exercise.
Of course, this approach leaves much to be debated. Is pornography “wrongful” like fraud or defamation, or rightful and subject
only to reasonable regulation? What constitutes an interference with
the liberties of others sufficient to justify a regulation? Answers to
these and other such questions are highly contextual and cannot be
formulated in the abstract.
I ask you now to accept for the sake of argument this idealization
of constitutional rights protection according to which wrongful acts
(like fraud and defamation) can constitutionally be prohibited while
rightful exercises of liberty can be regulated, provided that such regulation is warranted to protect the liberties of others. How might this
approach reduce the fear of enforcing unenumerated rights?
Most obviously, by reducing the cost to governance of recognizing
a right as judicially protected, such a scheme reduces the pressure to
limit enforcement to just those liberties deemed by some to be fundamental. If all liberty may constitutionally be regulated, and only
wrongful acts prohibited, then the recognition of a wide range of lib50

See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.46, at
1315–16 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning parade permit cases).
51
See TRIBE, supra note 48, at 794 (“Government may be deemed to have ‘abridged’
speech . . . if on its face a governmental action is targeted at ideas or information that government seeks to suppress, or if a governmental action neutral on its face was motivated by . . . an
intent to single out constitutionally protected speech for control or penalty.”) (citations omitted).
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erties as constitutionally protected does not threaten all government
regulation.
The judicial protection of liberties of any and all kinds would require that two questions be asked about any particular law affecting
liberty: First, if a law prohibits conduct, is that conduct wrongful in
the sense that it violates the rights of others, as does murder, rape,
robbery, etc? If so the prohibition is constitutional. If the conduct is
not, in itself, necessarily rights-violating, then it may not be prohibited, but it may still be regulated.
Second, if the conduct is rightful, in the sense that it does not
necessarily violate the rights of others, then is a regulation of its exercise needed to protect the rights of others from risks associated with
its exercise? Think about driving regulations that permit, but regulate, the manner of operating motor vehicles. Such regulations
would be permissible, provided they were not shown to unduly burden the right because the government disapproves of its exercise or
because the restriction is unreasonable.
Relevant to the assessment of whether a regulation is unreasonable would be whether its adoption was promoted or influenced by
interest groups or factions who either disapprove of the conduct as
“immoral” (or some euphemism for immoral) or who wish to benefit
economically by restricting its exercise by potential competitors. As
examples of the former, think of those who think the automobile is
52
the scourge of the earth, or who oppose eating meat. As examples
of the latter, think of local wine retailers lobbying for the prohibition
of direct on-line sales by out-of-state wineries, or conventional beauticians lobbying for restrictions on hair-braiding shops.
So, if all liberty may be reasonably regulated and only wrongful
acts that violate the rights of others can be prohibited, then the prospect of deeming any particular liberty to be constitutionally protected, while far from unproblematic, becomes much less scary. With
any particular law, the judicial inquiry would shift from discerning
the content of a particular unenumerated right to whether the regulation can be justified as necessary to protect the rights of others. If
the law prohibits particular conduct altogether, the inquiry would be
whether the prohibited acts necessarily or invariably violate the rights
of others.
Would this put an end to all controversies or disputes concerning
regulations? Of course not. Would it greatly increase the amount of
litigation concerning the constitutionality of laws? Certainly it would,
at least at first. Eventually, however, we could expect considerations
of the wrongfulness of acts, or the necessity of regulations, to be in52

Of course, these activists are free to contend that such laws do violate the rights of others,
as they often do, in which case their claims must be considered carefully.
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ternalized by the law-making branches, which would greatly improve
the chances of laws passing meaningful scrutiny, and reduce the success rate of challenges.
I do not think it is unrealistic to hope for a return to the days
when Congress actually debated in a serious manner whether a proposed enactment was within or without its constitutional powers as it
53
did when considering the first national bank. We see a glimmer of
this where courts do protect such liberties as freedom of speech,
press and assembly. While most legislators who consider these rights
at all consider only whether the courts will uphold what they do,
some actually reach their own independent conclusions on whether
such acts really do interfere with these protected rights.
The approach I am recommending would still require courts to
distinguish between rightful and wrongful conduct in order to uphold complete prohibitions of conduct, as opposed to regulations.
Wrongful acts, as I have defined them, are those that inherently violate the rights of others. Some may reject this definition as overly restrictive. We can debate this another time. Others who accept the
distinction, at least for the sake of argument, might still question the
competency of courts to make such a distinction. But this is far less
problematic than it may at first appear.
For one thing, courts would not have to start from scratch. We
have a very long tradition of deeming some actions to be wrongful,
such as murder, rape, robbery, burglary, theft—all the crimes I became a state court prosecutor to prosecute. While this tradition is
not infallible, it is as good a baseline as any from which to depart. We
must also remember that rightful activity is traditionally and routinely
distinguished from wrongful activity by the law governing property,
contracts and torts. So what is really being claimed is that, unless private conduct can be characterized as a trespass, tort, or breach of
contract, it is privileged in the sense that it may only be regulated reasonably and not prohibited altogether. While some might claim that
this proposal would require judges to be philosopher kings, it would
be more accurate to view judges as accomplished first-year law students who know their private law subjects.
CONCLUSION
Assuming the idea of protecting unenumerated rights no longer
seems so frightening, what warrant is there in the Constitution for doing so? You already know the answer to this. The original meaning
53

See generally LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
15–85 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D.A. Hall eds., Washington, D.C., Gales & Seaton 1832) (detailing
the discussion on the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States).
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of the Ninth Amendment mandates that unenumerated rights are to
be treated no less well—neither denied or disparaged—than enumerated rights, and we have already seen how enumerated rights may
be regulated, and wrongful acts prohibited. The original meaning of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
creates the same mandate for laws enacted and enforced by state governments. The evidence I have examined elsewhere shows that by
“rights . . . retained by the people” the Ninth Amendment meant
natural liberty rights, while the “privileges” or “immunities” to which
the Fourteenth Amendment refers includes these natural liberty
rights and the additional positive individual rights contained in the
54
Bill of Rights.
The original meaning of natural rights included all liberties, and
was routinely summarized as the liberty to acquire, use, enjoy and
55
dispose of property. This would also include the property, Locke
56
maintained, that persons have in their bodies. In short, it is the
right to use what is yours as you see fit or what today would be referred to as “liberty interests.” This liberty is bounded by the equal
liberties of others, so it is not liberty but license to violate the rights of
others. While unquestionably capacious, this conception of rights
excludes the right to demand things from others who have not themselves violated any rights—what today would be called “welfare
rights.” This is not to say, however, that the federal or state constitu57
tions do not protect positive rights, because they do. Nor is it to
deny that government may create welfare rights or “entitlements”
schemes at its discretion. This is only to say that the unenumerated
natural rights to which the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment refer
are liberty rights.
The principal difference between the scrutiny of state and federal
laws lies not in these textual protections of unenumerated liberties,
but in the nature of the justification that is properly offered on behalf
of prohibitions and regulations. To be proper, the federal government must be pursuing an object listed in Article I, Section 8 (or in
one of the amendments), while the states must be properly exercising
their general police power. Elsewhere, I provide an approach to the

54

See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 53–86 (2004) (explaining this
conclusion at length).
55
See id. at 257 (noting that some scholars view these rights as the appropriate formulation
of natural rights).
56
See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 111 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690) (“[E]very Man has Property in
his own Person . . . .”) (emphasis added).
57
See BARNETT, supra note 54, at 236–37 (identifying protections of positive rights in state
constitutions).
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58

police power that is largely based on the Lockean approach devel59
oped by treatise-authors Thomas Cooley and Christopher Tiede60
man. I cannot resist noting here, however, that the so-called police
power is itself unenumerated, and the uncertainty of this nontextual
power has not stopped it from being invoked by courts, and even by
those who resist enforcing unenumerated rights because of their uncertain content. Why? Because of their views of “sovereignty” of
course.
In the end, for those who respect the text of the Constitution, as
well as its original meaning, the protection of unenumerated rights is
simply not optional. To disregard the unenumerated rights provisions because they do not conform to one’s conception of the Rule of
Law is as objectionable as discarding the enumerated powers scheme
because it does not conform to one’s conception of Justice. Both approaches put one’s own visions above that of the written Constitution.
Some may even call this “judicial activism,” though I continue to re61
sist using that largely vacuous pejorative term. In this essay, I hope I
have shown why, whatever else might justify setting the text of the
Constitution aside, it cannot be the claim that we should be afraid of
the unenumerated rights to which that text refers.

58

See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 429, 430
(2004) (“[T]he police power of states includes the power to prohibit wrongful and to regulate
rightful conduct of individuals.”).
59
See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1868) (describing Cooley’s interpretation of the police power).
60
See also BARNETT, supra note 54, at 323–31 (discussing the views of Cooley and Tiedeman).
See generally CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN
THE UNITED STATES (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas 1886) (photo. reprint ed. 2001) (laying out Tiedeman’s view of police power).
61
See Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist” Court? The Commerce Clause Cases,
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1275–81 (2002) (discussing the meaning of “judicial activism”).

